On February 27, 2026, President Donald Trump floated a “friendly takeover” of Cuba, claiming the island lacks money, food, and fuel — brought about by US sanctions, tariffs and blockade — which has weakened the Cuban government opening up the possibility for a soft capitulation of sorts. The remark came amid intensified US pressure when in January 2026 Trump crafted an executive order threatening tariffs on any country supplying oil to Cuba, following the US ousting of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, Cuba’s primary oil patron.
By Miguel Santos García
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a Cuban-American hawk, is reportedly leading “very high level” discussions with Cuban leaders, signaling Washington sees an opening amid a weakened Cuba. The sanctions, blockade create a dire context as fuel quarantine has pushed Cuba toward collapse with widespread blackouts.
While Cuba is doing business with Russia and China, it is doing so at a pace and scale utterly insufficient to alter its strategic vulnerability and this hesitation may prove fatal.
Moscow has pledged financial assistance, with Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov stating Russia and other BRICS members are doing “everything we can” to support Havana. A Chinese-managed tanker carrying Russian fuel is supposedly currently bound for Cuba, yet these gestures amount to too little when Cuba requires much more. The island needs up to 100,000 barrels of oil daily, and sporadic shipments from Russia cannot fill the void left by Venezuelan supplies, all the while Cuba’s response has been cautious rather than decisive.
Meanwhile, Cuba has announced economic reforms and an investment portfolio exceeding $30 billion across 426 projects, seeking foreign partners in energy, food production, and mining. But these reforms came late, and the partnerships offered are incremental rather than transformative. These steps should have been taken much earlier in order for the partnerships to be able to develop the island’s capabilities.
The deeper problem is Cuba’s apparent hesitation to fully embrace these willing partners, perhaps out of fear of further infuriating Washington, or due to institutional resistance to ceding sovereign control over strategic assets or because they think middle power states can aid them.
A true strategic counterweight would have required bold concessions long ago like granting Russia or China long-term management of Cuban ports, embedding their military and economic assets so deeply that any US move against Cuba would become a direct challenge to Moscow or Beijing. Instead, Cuba has pursued half-measures, enough engagement to provoke US hostility, insufficient engagement to secure genuine protection.
The result is slow-motion capitulation as Cuba seems to be waiting for Western states, like Canada and the EU to save it from the US, which they cannot and will not do. Modernizing with China and Russia was always the best bet, but hesitation has left Havana exposed at the moment of maximum peril. The window may not yet be closed, but the margin for error has vanished.
Trump’s “friendly takeover” rhetoric represents a calculated and cynical escalation in long-standing US policy of regime destabilization, now repackaged as economic integration. The timing is strategically significant, coming after the ousting of Maduro and the subsequent executive order weaponizing secondary sanctions. The involvement of Rubio signals this is not merely a diplomatic overture but the culmination of decades of exile advocacy for regime change through economic strangulation. Reported backchannel communications involving Cuban leadership suggest the US is simultaneously pursuing coercive diplomacy while attempting to identify fractures within the regime.
The most telling evidence of Cuban foot-dragging lies in the concessions not made. Granting Russia or China long-term management of Cuban ports would present Moscow and Beijing with permanent assets to defend, transforming the Caribbean from a US lake into contested space. Cuba has not taken these steps, whether due to misguided nationalist resistance, fear of provoking immediate US retaliation, or bureaucratic inertia bound to victimhood.
Looking forward, Cuba’s half-measures have produced the worst of both worlds, sufficient engagement with Russia and China to provoke US hostility, but insufficient engagement to secure meaningful allied protection or modernization. The fuel blockade has bitten deeply because Russian supply commitments lack the consistency that would require major infrastructure investments. The absence of Chinese-managed ports means Beijing has no assets at risk compelling a forceful response.
Cuba has signaled willingness to partner with great powers but has not given them sufficient stake in its survival to make defense of the island a national priority. This strategic miscalculation has left Havana waiting for salvation from partners who sympathize but are not sufficiently invested to act decisively. In great-power politics, half-alliances are often more dangerous than no alliances at all as they provoke the adversary — which is the US — without securing the protector.
Miguel Santos García is a Puerto Rican writer and political analyst who mainly writes about the geopolitics of neocolonial conflicts and Hybrid Wars within the 4th Industrial Revolution, the ongoing New Cold War and the transition towards multipolarity. Visit his blog here.
He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).
