The March 7 call in Miami is not regional integration but geopolitical classification. Under the rhetoric of security and cooperation, Washington reactivates the logic of a sphere of influence to contain China and discipline a fragmented Latin America with unequal margins of autonomy.
The United States draws the line again. Not with tanks or marines, but with a “mandatory” summit for “friendly” and “loyal” countries. The language is not diplomatic; it is disciplinary. Divide and rule. Inside or outside. Aligned or suspect. Donald Trump’s invitation does not seek to integrate Latin America; it seeks to classify it.
What is at stake is not just another hemispheric meeting, but the explicit reinstatement of a sphere-of-influence logic. Under the appearance of strategic coordination, the call consolidates a hierarchy: sovereign states turned into functional satellites according to their degree of geopolitical obedience.
Context and correlation of forces
Latin America is experiencing a moment of ambiguous gravitation. It is not the center of the international system, but neither is it a passive periphery. It possesses critical minerals, energy reserves, strategic biodiversity and fundamental logistical corridors. The lithium of the Southern Cone, Chilean copper, Brazilian and Venezuelan oil, the Amazon, bioceanic corridors and Atlantic-Pacific ports make it a key piece in the global energy transition.
At the same time, China has consolidated over the last two decades a structural presence: infrastructure financing, trade, telecommunications, energy. It is not a military penetration, but an economic and logistical one. The United States, accustomed to hemispheric hegemony without competition, perceives this expansion as displacement.
The summit of the “loyal” must be read within that framework. It is not a gesture of regional integration. It is a response to Latin America’s diversification.
Divide and rule as a renewed doctrine
The mechanism is classic: reward the aligned, isolate the dissenters, negotiate bilaterally. Fragment in order to dominate.
Latin American fragmentation already existed. The call institutionalizes it. A core of “reliable countries” is created against a perimeter of suspicion. Loyalty replaces sovereignty as the criterion of belonging.
It is no coincidence that the invitation is directed at governments considered close to Washington. Nor is the implicit language accidental: reinforced cooperation for the faithful, indirect pressure for those maintaining strategic ties with China or autonomous positions in multilateral forums.
Structural coercion and asymmetry
The United States does not need explicit threats. Coercion in Latin America is structural.
First, financial dependence.
Many countries depend on access to markets, multilateral financing and credit ratings linked to Western-dominated architecture.
Second, migration.
The externalization of migration control turns several governments into managers of the U.S. border. Security cooperation becomes an instrument of pressure.
Third, selective sanctions.
The Venezuelan experience shows that the margin for economic punishment is real. The signal is pedagogical: the cost of dissent is tangible.
Fourth, supply chains.
Countries highly integrated into the U.S. economy, such as Mexico or Central America, have political freedom limited by productive interdependence.
Differentiated limitations and freedoms
Not all Latin American countries possess the same room for maneuver.
Brazil has demographic scale, a robust domestic market and significant trade diversification with China, Europe and the United States. It can negotiate from a position of greater relative autonomy. Its foreign policy has historically sought multipolar balance.
Mexico, by contrast, is structurally anchored to the United States through the USMCA. Its strategic autonomy is narrow. It may diversify rhetorically, but its productive dependence is deep.
Chile and Peru depend on mineral exports to Asia, especially China, but also require Western financial access. Their margin is intermediate: they cannot break with Washington, but neither can they dispense with Beijing.
Central America has less structural capacity. Migration and financial dependence reduce real autonomy. The U.S. invitation operates as a reminder of functional subordination.
The Lithium Triangle faces a paradox: it possesses a strategic resource, yet lacks regional coordination to negotiate as a bloc. Fragmentation prevents transforming the mineral into collective geopolitical leverage.
View from the Global South and China
From a Global South perspective, the U.S. call is not horizontal cooperation but vertical reaffirmation of power. China offers an alternative narrative: no explicit political interference and financing without formal ideological conditionalities. That proves attractive to governments seeking sovereign space.
However, this is not romanticism. China acts with strategic rationality: secure supply, expand infrastructure, consolidate logistical networks. It is not altruism; it is structural interest. The difference lies in method: explicit political coercion versus implicit economic conditioning.
For many Latin American countries, the relationship with China expands room for maneuver vis-à-vis Washington. Competition among powers can translate into better negotiation terms if managed with strategic intelligence.
Strategic outlook
Scenario one: disciplined alignment.
Countries accepting the logic of loyalty reinforce structural dependence. The region fragments further. China consolidates presence among the non-aligned. Hemispheric polarization deepens.
Scenario two: pragmatic balance.
Governments attend the summit, extract concrete concessions and maintain ties with China. A frontal rupture is avoided. Latin America operates as a hinge, not a satellite.
Scenario three: autonomous regional articulation.
This requires political will currently absent. Coordination on critical minerals, energy transition and trade would allow negotiation as a bloc with both Washington and Beijing. Without cohesion, this scenario is unlikely.
Conclusion
Trump’s summit is not an innocent gesture. It is a delimitation of field. A reminder of hierarchy. A disciplinary message.
Latin America faces a historic decision: accept binary classification of loyalty or build its own strategic capacity.
Smaller countries have less margin, but they are not condemned to automatic obedience. Competition among powers opens space if used with calculation rather than automatic alignment.
The region does not need to choose between Washington and Beijing. It needs to choose between fragmented subordination and coordinated autonomy.
Divide and rule only works when the divided accept fragmentation as destiny.
Informational addendum on the call
The White House formally announced the call on February 2, 2026. The meeting was set for March 7, 2026 in Miami, Florida. The official statement framed the encounter as a space to address regional security, migration, organized crime and investment, but explicitly underlined the need to confront what Washington defined as growing strategic influence of China in the Western Hemisphere.
The invitation was directed to governments considered “friends” or aligned with the United States. Countries mentioned in press reports include Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, El Salvador, Ecuador and Honduras. The exclusion of certain governments not regarded as close to Washington drew attention, reinforcing the political reading of regional segmentation.
The meeting carries no juridically binding character. Its force is political: preferential access, strategic cooperation and potential financial or diplomatic backing for those within the convened core. This architecture confirms that the summit is not a mechanism of Latin American integration, but an instrument of hemispheric ordering under alignment criteria.
With these facts, the strategic reading becomes clearer: the call is not neutral. It is a calculated move within structural competition over Latin America.
