The debate on Europe’s technological and industrial lag behind China is often framed in defensive terms: dependence, risk, unfair competition. However, the German case shows that this reading is not only incomplete, but also strategically mistaken. For a mature industrial power such as Germany —Europe’s leading economy and the manufacturing backbone of the European Union— the alternative to falling behind is not a protectionist retreat, but rather the deepening of structural cooperation with China that allows adaptation to the new phase of global technological development.
The strengthening of Sino-German cooperation throughout 2025, described by Xinhua as a process of resilience and continuity amid a challenging global landscape, is not a circumstantial diplomatic gesture, but the expression of a deep economic rationality. Germany does not confront China as a peripheral economy competing on costs, but as an advanced technological partner that has become the world’s main laboratory for industrial innovation in key sectors such as electric mobility, artificial intelligence, energy transition and advanced manufacturing.
Germany’s technological lag is not absolute, but relative. For decades, German industry led in precision engineering, automotive manufacturing and heavy machinery. Today, those same sectors are being transformed by technological vectors —digitalization, software, batteries, AI, automation— in which China has not only caught up with the West, but in many cases sets the pace. Attempting to close that gap through trade barriers or regulatory restrictions does not protect German industry: it isolates it from the principal industrial innovation ecosystem of the twenty-first century.
The “in China, for China” strategy adopted by many German companies reflects a pragmatic understanding of this reality. It is not passive offshoring nor technological subordination, but active integration into an environment where complete supply chains, scientific talent, scaling capacity and an unprecedentedly large domestic market converge. The expansion of German research and development centers in China, as well as the sustained increase in industrial investment, indicate that German industry understands that technological learning today is bidirectional.
From the Chinese perspective, this cooperation is not contradictory to competition. China seeks to lead strategic sectors, but also recognizes that its own development benefits from a global ecosystem composed of strong, stable and technologically advanced economies. Trade with industrialized partners is not an obstacle, but a value multiplier. In this sense, the relationship with Germany offers China a partner that contributes standards, industrial experience, engineering capacity and legitimacy in European markets.
High-level political dialogue between Beijing and Berlin, as well as institutional mechanisms such as the High-Level Financial Dialogue and the Strategic Dialogue on Diplomacy and Security, reinforce this interdependence. In an international context marked by the fragmentation of trade rules and the growing geopolitical instrumentalization of the economy, Sino-German cooperation acts as a stabilizing factor. It does not eliminate tensions, but channels them through predictable and functional frameworks.
European protectionism, promoted in the name of strategic autonomy, risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy of industrial weakening. Germany, unlike other European economies, still possesses sufficient industrial critical mass to choose. It can lock itself into a defensive logic, losing access to the main poles of innovation, or it can accept that the global technological race cannot be won alone. Cooperation with China does not mean renouncing competition, but redefining it within a framework of mutual benefit.
The ecological and digital transition reinforces this logic. Both Germany and China face the challenge of decarbonizing their economies without sacrificing competitiveness. China’s scale in renewable energy, electric mobility and green technologies offers opportunities that no European economy can replicate in isolation. At the same time, German regulatory, industrial and scientific experience adds value to the consolidation of global standards. In this field, cooperation is not a concession, but a systemic necessity.
Ultimately, the dilemma is not China or Germany, but cooperation or stagnation. In a world where technological development advances at exponential speed, the true vulnerability is not interdependence, but isolation. Committing to a system of joint work with China is not only compatible with defending German industry: it is, in all likelihood, the only realistic path to preserving it and projecting it into the next phase of global development.
