A year ago the first Russian troops entered Ukraine and airborne commandos aimed at Kiev with the goal of removing Zelenski. The determined Ukrainian response thwarted the attack, and with the massive logistical, intelligence and weapons support provided by the United States and other NATO countries, a war of position whose end is not in sight began.
By Fabrizio Battistelli, Giampaolo Cadalanu, Mao Valpiana.
Russia is unlikely to be able to overcome the resistance of the Ukrainians, equipped by the West and motivated to defend themselves, but even for Ukraine it will be difficult to defeat an army like Russia’s on the ground. Even with their organizational, doctrinal and training shortcomings, the Russian armed forces have an endless background in numbers, which the Military Balance published in London quantifies at about 800,000 military personnel at arms and 2 million reservists.
Not to mention the 1,900 tactical and theater nuclear warheads deployed by Moscow, 3/4 of which are aimed at European military bases and cities. Points out Fabrizio Battistelli, president of Archivio Disarmo: “In the days of the Cold War it was considered unacceptable to threaten to use nuclear weapons to cover up flaws in one’s conventional system. Unfortunately, in the balance of power, it does not mean that the unacceptable cannot happen.”
Seemingly less catastrophic but equally critical is the upgrading of conventional armaments. The quantum leap in armored means (the Leopards promised by Germany and other countries) and the possible grand entry of the air weapons (the fighter-bombers demanded by Kiev) can only raise the rungs of escalation further; just as it becomes increasingly urgent to open effective negotiations leading first to a truce and then to a peace that, sooner or later, can only consist of mediation between opposites.
Ucraina: a un anno dall’invasione russa
(Ukraine: one year after the Russian invasion)
Insights and analysis in the February issue of IRIAD REVIEW in uscita domani (IRIAD REVIEW out tomorrow), 17.02.2023.
